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ABSTRACT:  ‘Ecological civilisation’ establishes ecology as an ur-science which informs a 
radical rethinking of humanity’s relationship with Nature, fueled by the acknowledgement that 
neoliberalist assumptions about Nature and science ultimately pose dire threats to the survival 
of the human species. Friedrich Schelling’s thought, and specifically his Naturphilosophie, has 
rightly been seen as a precursor of the process philosophy underwriting contemporary notions 
of ecological civilisation and the critique of the Cartesian gap between humanity and Nature 
perpetuated by neoliberalism. Yet the psyche-Nature isomorphism cemented early in 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie by his description of Nature in protopsychoanalytic terms such as 
drive [Trieb] and compulsion [Zwang] gesture to a dark, indeterminate Nature which, in its 
profound ambivalence toward its own products, resists idealist projections of unity or harmony.  
The question thus arises: can the transformative political action demanded by an ecological 
civilisation be underwritten by a Nature infected by an indeterminacy which also implicates the 
human psyche?  This essay explores this question by examining first the Nature articulated by 
Schelling in his First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), then turning to this 
Nature’s recrudescence as theodicy and a theory of personality in his Philosophical Investigations 
into the Essence of Human Freedom (1809).  I conclude without concluding, with more questions 
than answers in the form of brief observations on the implications of Schelling’s dark Nature 
for ethical metanarrative and its relevance to the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
‘Acorn.’  ‘Ash.’  ‘Beech.’  ‘Cygnet.’  ‘Dandelion.’  ‘Fern.’  ‘Heather.’  ‘Lark.’  
‘Mistletoe.’  ‘Nectar.’  ‘Newt.’  ‘Otter.’  ‘Pasture.’  In early 2018 the editors of 
the Oxford Junior Dictionary decided to remove these and other words describing 
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Nature from their children’s dictionary in favour of contemporary substitutes 
such as ‘analogue,’ ‘attachment,’ ‘broadband,’ ‘blog,’ and ‘cut and paste.’  In 
fact, these changes were made back in 2007 – they only recently attracted 
scrutiny when, in 2015, a group of writers including Canadian author Margaret 
Atwood and Sir Andrew Motion (UK Poet Laureate from 1999-2009) wrote to 
protest the decision.1 
Although this attempt to trim and prune Nature’s linguistic proliferation 
may not be an overtly political position, it nevertheless aligns with the uniquely 
neoliberalist trajectory of pathological monetisation – a pathology which 
objectifies Nature as a source of capitalist gain just as it marginalises discourses 
which question or challenge it.  Arran Gare aptly describes this project as 
paradoxically both materialist and idealist: on the one hand, a governing 
scientific materialism naturalises the premises of empirical science as capable of 
explaining all aspects of human experience, stripping Nature of its depth to 
enforce a hegemony of the distinct and measurable.  On the other hand, 
neoliberalism’s Idealism reduces Being and the world to a social construct and, 
‘while sharing [scientific materialism’s] commitment to the domination of 
nature, differs in treating human subjects as above nature and in celebrating 
human rationality.’2  This paradox has precipitated what can only be 
described, from an anthropocentric perspective, as an ecological crisis our 
species has never before seen. 
One proposed solution to this crisis is to nurture an ‘ecological civilisation’ – 
in other words, to cultivate a ‘religious’ relationship with Nature in the broadest 
non-denominational sense.3  To be sure, this idea ultimately harks back to the 
 
1 Alison Flood, ‘Oxford Junior Dictionary’s replacement of “natural” words with 21st-century 
terms sparks outcry’, The Guardian, 13 Jan 2015, 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jan/13/oxford-junior-dictionary-replacement-
natural-words>. Referenced 30 Mar 2019. 
2 Arran Gare, ‘The Roots of Postmodernism’, in Catherine Heller and Anne Daniell (eds.), 
Process and Difference: Between Cosmological and Poststructuralist Postmodernisms, Albany, State 
University of New York Press, 2002, p. 32. 
3 Put simply, Arran Gare defines ‘ecological civilization’ as a mode of human existence based 
on a ‘transformation of the relationship between science and other domains of culture’ which 
reworks current ‘deep assumptions’ about humanity’s relationship to Nature (Arran Gare, 
‘Toward an Ecological Civilization’, Process Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2010, p. 12.  While Gare does 
not define this transformation as ‘religious,’ the word’s complex etymology compellingly 
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First System Programme of  German Idealism, written most likely in the final years of 
the eighteenth century by either Schelling, Hegel, or Hölderlin.  The Programme 
is a manifesto of both German Idealism and Romanticism; it envisions the 
‘absolutely free individual’ as the starting point for a ‘mythology of reason’ 
which unites the sensuous with the world of ideas to achieve ‘the equal 
formation of all forces, in particular persons as well as all individuals.’4  But as 
we turn to the Naturphilosophie of Friedrich Schelling’s 1799 First Outline of  a 
System of  the Philosophy of  Nature, we will see that these forces are not so easily 
enlisted into the service of either human consciousness or a post-Kantian 
kingdom of ends.  Indeed, even as Schelling’s conception of Nature merits him 
a place among the first process philosophers, this conception is also 
protopsychoanalytic; Schelling is already describing a dark, indeterminate Nature 
in the register of compulsion, drive, and derangement – a Nature which cannot 
be contained by the rubric of ‘overcoming’ in either individual or collective 
political senses, and a Nature which would become so important to the major 
psychoanalytic theories of the 20th century. 
In this spirit, this essay asks a crucial question meant to productively 
interrogate the idea of ecological civilisation: to what extent can we ground 
such a civilisation on a dark, indeterminate Nature – in essence, to ground 
civilisation on the ungrounded?  Put differently: can we feasibly underwrite a 
new social contract with a Nature that is itself deranged and schizophrenic 
toward its own products?  Gare rightly recognises Schelling as a seminal thinker 
in the tradition of process thought with which the notions of ecological 
civilisation and speculative naturalism are closely aligned.5  Moreover, 
ecological civilisation’s drive to make ecology an ur-science which constellates 
other disciplines makes a working-through of Schelling’s engagement with the 
 
addresses the nature of this relationship.  ‘Religion’ is perhaps based on the Latin religare (‘to 
bind’), but in his ‘On the Nature of the Gods’ Cicero derives it from relegere (‘to re-read’), 
suggesting a practice of careful attention and, in this sense, ‘devotion.’  Both senses speak to the 
ethos of care and attention demanded by an ecological civilisation. 
4 I refer to David Ferrell Krell’s translation of the Programme.  See David Krell, The Tragic 
Absolute: German Idealism and the Languishing of God, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 2005, pp. 25-26. 
5 Arran Gare, ‘Speculative Naturalism: A Manifesto’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural 
and Social Philosophy, vol. 10, no. 2, 2014, pp. 307f., 308 n. 17. 
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problem of Nature all the more important.  Thus, I begin with the 
Naturphilosophie of Schelling’s First Outline to articulate his first and most radical 
conception of Nature’s infinite productivity.  I will then turn to Naturphilosophie’s 
extension to theodicy in the 1809 Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of  
Human Freedom (the ‘Freedom essay’), which offers crucial insights into how 
Nature’s derangement operates in the domains of the human and divine.  I will 
end by revisiting the idea of transformative action which underwrites 
‘ecological civilisation’ and explore some of the implications of Schelling’s 
framework for issues of ethics and morality. 
SCHELLING’S NATURPHILOSOPHIE: INHIBITION AND ‘UNNATURAL 
NATURE’ 
In contrast to a scientific mechanism which understands Nature solely in terms 
of surface relations between phenomena, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is a 
‘speculative physics’ which aims to discover the fundamental dynamic forces 
and drives – the ground of Nature’s infinite productivity.  That is, 
Naturphilosophie ‘assumes that the sum of phenomena is not a mere world, but of 
necessity a Nature (that is, that this whole is not merely a product, but at the 
same time productive).’6  Thus Naturphilosophie operates in a register not of stasis 
but of process, drive and compulsion: in the Introduction to the Outline, 
Schelling writes that ‘Nature can produce nothing but what shows regularity 
and purpose, and Nature is compelled [gezwungen] to produce it’ (FO 194).  This 
Nature is one of ‘absolute activity,’ which is marked by ‘the drive [Trieb] to an 
infinite development’ (FO 18).  Through this productive drive, Nature is also 
compelled to create organic and inorganic natural products as part of a general 
economy7 of infinitely productive relations.  And like Nature in turn, the 
 
6 Friedrich Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith Peterson, 
Albany, State University of New York Press, 2004, p. 197.  Hereafter cited parenthetically in 
the text as FO. 
7 In The Accursed Share (3 vols., 1946-1949), Georges Bataille juxtaposes a restricted economy (a 
network of limited and discernible relations between things, such as the act of changing a tire 
which involves predetermined actions and tools) with a general economy, which accounts for 
the excess of energy in complex systems.  Whether this non-recuperable energy is expressed in 
culture as art or more broadly as war (Bataille’s main examples), it poses a risk to the prevailing 
 GORD BARENTSEN 95 
organism self-organises according to principles irreducible to a conceptual 
system, recapitulating Nature’s infinite productivity in ways which anticipate a 
mind-Nature parallelism which Schelling will later explore in the Freedom essay.  
As Robert Richards writes, ‘[Naturphilosophie] suggested that nature might 
furnish a path back to the self [. . .] the exploration of nature might even be 
regarded as a necessary propaedeutic to the development of the self.’8  Nature 
is a Deleuzian fold, entangling interiority and exteriority: one finds oneself 
within Nature, but in going back through Nature one can move forward 
through Nature’s ‘exploration.’  Indeed, Jason Wirth offers a compelling case 
for considering the Naturphilosophie, if not as psychology, nonetheless 
psychologically; he suggests that ‘doing Naturphilosophie’ is not ‘doing a science,’ but 
rather ‘doing philosophy in accordance with nature,’ as ‘a gateway into the 
originating experience of philosophizing’ itself.9  To plumb the depths of 
Nature is to sound the depths of one’s own nature. 
Schelling’s particular formulation of Naturphilosophie derives from the 
broader field of German nature philosophy which, at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, encompassed Romantic biology and other disciplines.  Writing that 
‘all Romantic biologists were Naturphilosophen, but not all Naturphilosophen were 
Romantics’,10 Richards argues that Naturphilosophie not only shifts away from 
eighteenth-century mechanist philosophy but also marks Schelling’s move away 
from Kant within Naturphilosophie itself.  Contrary to Kant’s conception of the 
archetypes of species as transcendental entities of an ideal reality, Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie begins with the ‘real’ instead of the ‘ideal,’ existence instead of 
categorical consciousness: ‘the ideal must arise out of the real and admit of 
explanation from it’ (FO 194).  Schelling moves against Kant’s noumenal-
 
system.  See Georges Bataille,  The Accursed Share, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 1, 3 vols., New 
York, Zone Books, 1991, pp. 23-26.  
8 Robert Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, Chicago 
and London, The University of Chicago Press, 2002, p. 134. 
9 Jason Wirth, Schelling’s Practice of the Wild: Time, Art, Imagination, Albany, State University of 
New York Press, 2015, p. 17.  Schelling’s use of fundamentally psychological terms such as drive 
[Trieb] and compulsion [Zwang] to describe Nature prefigure their deployment in depth 
psychology, particularly Jungian metapsychology.  For the connection between Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie and Jungian metapsychology see Gord Barentsen, ‘Silent Partnerships: 
Schelling, Jung, and the Romantic Metasubject’, Symposium, vol. 19, no. 1, 2015, pp. 71ff. 
10 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, p. 8. 
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phenomenal bifurcation of existence on the one hand, and on the other hand 
he also moves against Fichte’s ‘absolute I,’ which makes Nature an 
epiphenomenon of subjective consciousness.  In the architectonic of Kant’s 
Critique of  Pure Reason, organicism is a regulative idea which denies Nature any 
genuinely aleatory force.  In contrast, Schelling’s Naturphilosophie is ‘an a priori 
study of the ‘Idea’ of nature [. . .] [it] is not a mechanical system but a series of 
basic ‘forces’ or ‘impulses’ that mirror at the basic level the same kind of 
determinations that are operative in us at the level of freedom.  [Thus 
Naturphilosophie] must construct an account of nature that is continuous with our 
freedom.’11  
Richards writes, perhaps with some irony, that ‘the fundamental idea of 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie was simply that nature strove to achieve the 
absolute’.12  Hardly a simple idea, however, for although Schelling critiques 
Kantian formalism by conceiving Nature as radical productivity, he does not 
jettison the a priori.  Rather, anticipating Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, 
Schelling relocates the a priori in experience.  In the Introduction to the First 
Outline he writes: 
Not only do we know this or that through experience, but we originally know 
nothing at all except through experience, and by means of experience, and in this 
sense the whole of our knowledge consists of the judgments of experience. These 
judgments become a priori principles when we become conscious of them as 
necessary [. . .] every judgment which is merely historical for me—i.e., a 
judgment of experience—becomes, notwithstanding, an a priori principle as soon 
as I arrive, whether directly or indirectly, at insight into its internal necessity. [. . 
.] It is not, therefore, that WE KNOW Nature as a priori, but Nature IS a priori. (FO 198) 
Written after the First Outline, and as an attempt to rein in Nature’s infinite 
productivity by synchronising it with transcendental Idealism’s emphasis on 
self-consciousness, Schelling’s Introduction describes Nature’s productivity is 
‘the most perfect geometry [. . .] a mode of explanation whereby the real itself 
is transported into the ideal world, and those motions are changed into 
intuitions which take place only in ourselves, and to which nothing outside of us 
 
11 Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, pp. 178, 181. 
12 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, p. 297. 
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corresponds’ (FO 193).  But even here, in introducing psychology and appealing 
to experience as the criteria for a priori principles, Schelling does not rein in 
this indeterminacy so much as redouble it on the level of psyche.13  And in 
stating that ‘Nature is a priori’ he folds the a priori back into contingency, 
which makes the Naturphilosophie forever resistant to encapsulation by self-
consciousness just as it opens up self-consciousness to the contingency of 
Nature. 
In the Naturphilosophie, then, the a priori is no longer separated from 
phenomena, but is now imbricated with thought’s (revisable) experience of 
natural objects as external stimuli.  What Hegel will economise as dialectic 
becomes, with Schelling, dialects of dialectic as the a priori is now beholden to 
the intensity of interactions and events written by ‘judgments of experience.’  
These judgements are part of an anterior organisation, but this organisation is 
paradoxically, simultaneously constituted by its parts in events where the 
individual realises a thought’s ‘internal necessity.’  Indeed, this internal 
necessity offers a way through what would otherwise pose a logical problem for 
Schelling: how far one can move from the deductive principles of natural 
science to experiential Nature if ‘the ideal must arise out of the real and admit 
of explanation from it’?  This movement is the sole means of discerning the a 
priori structures of Nature’s infinite unfolding. 
Schelling conceives the ‘regularity’ and purpose’ of both Nature’s 
productivity and thought’s ‘internal necessity’ (FO 194) as a graduated scale of 
development [Stufenfolge].  The Stufenfolge is a development of increasing 
complexity in Nature’s products, directed toward an ‘absolute product’ that 
‘lives in all products, that always becomes and never is, and in which the 
absolute activity [of Nature] exhausts itself’ (FO 16, 43 n).  This gradient is 
meant to culminate in man as its ‘greatest and most perfect form’ (FO 144), but 
the sexual generation of these beings both troubles and corroborates this 
 
13 Peterson translates versetzt as ‘transported,’ but versetzt can also mean ‘translate,’ an 
interpretation which profoundly troubles Schelling’s Idealist project in the Introduction.  Read 
as ‘translate,’ Nature retains some degree of originary authority as that which is rendered by a 
consciousness which can never fully articulate or replace it.  Indeed, Nature poses precisely this 
problem for the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), Schelling’s abortive attempt at Fichtean 
idealism. 
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Stufenfolge.  In other words, sexuality becomes a pharmakon, both a toxin and 
antidote for Nature.  Schelling writes of the separation of the sexes within 
Nature’s ‘infinite metamorphosis’ that ‘each organism has a level of formation 
at which [this] separation is necessary. [But this] highest point of disturbed 
equilibrium is [also] the moment of the reestablishment of equilibrium’ (FO 36, 
40-41).  This dis/equilibrium describes the production of the genus against the 
individual in a systolic-diastolic movement of expansion and contraction 
foregrounded in Schelling’s later work.  But sexual separation does not fold the 
organism back into a teleological hierarchy of developmental stages.  Instead, it 
opens the organism up to Nature’s radical productivity: ‘from the moment of 
the [separation] onward, the product no longer completely expresses the 
character of the stage of development at which it stood.’  Schelling describes 
this as ‘derangement’ [Störungheit], and this trope of illness marks the ‘most 
intense moment of natural activity’ in the organism (FO 39).  Nature blossoms 
through ‘abortive’ experiments on itself, seizing on its own aberrations, 
‘pursuing’ its individuative derangement as far as possible in a given 
manifestation (FO 41 n).  And precisely this derangement, this illness, is a drive 
toward absolute knowledge as what Tilottama Rajan refers to as ‘a following of 
the particular wherever it might lead, regardless of its consistency with a larger 
whole.’14  Each organism is a tumescence in Nature, a derangement of the 
Stufenfolge, a symptom of radical auto-alterity in Nature which resists Schelling’s 
attempt, in the later Introduction to the First Outline, to contain it in an anterior 
organisation which ‘must have existed as a whole previous to its parts’ (FO 198).  
But Schelling still faces the question which dogs him throughout his oeuvre: 
why is there something and not nothing?  How do things come to be from 
within Nature as the ‘most primal fluid–the absolute noncomposite [. . .] receptive 
to every form [. . .] a mass wherein no part is distinguished from the other by figure’ 
(FO 6)? 
Schelling’s answer to this question in the First Outline is inhibition – an 
intrinsic, primordial self-limiting force which engenders the phenomena of the 
natural world.  As a homogeneous ‘universal organism’ Nature, as ‘absolute 
 
14 Tilottama Rajan, ‘First Outline of a System of Theory: Schelling and the Margins of 
Philosophy, 1799-1815’, Studies in Romanticism, vol. 46, no. 3, 2007, p. 315. 
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activity,’ is ‘inhibited at sundry stages’ which produce natural objects (FO 6-7).  
Inhibition is at the root of all conflict and difference as ‘an original diremption in 
Nature itself [. . .] that original antithesis in the heart of Nature, which does not [. 
. .] itself appear’ but nevertheless constitutes Nature as object to itself (FO 205; 
my italics).  As the agent of Nature’s auto-alterity and the differential 
movement within an always already universal organism, inhibition infinitely 
counterbalances Nature’s infinite productivity.  Schelling writes: ‘If nature is 
absolute activity, then this activity must appear as inhibited ad infinitum. (The 
original cause of this inhibition must only be sought in [Nature] itself, since 
Nature is absolutely active)’ (FO 16).   Schelling is well aware of the ‘irresolvable 
difficulty’ of this deadlock between infinite activity and infinite inhibition (FO 
17).  David Farrell Krell sums up the problem in terms of Freudian Eros and 
Thanatos: 
Schelling [must] conceive of an original duplicity, a dyas, in which infinite 
activity and infinite inhibition work together to produce the natural world. [But 
sexuality and its relation to illness disturb this balance. Both] alike tend toward 
the universal and the infinite. It is as though infinite activity itself, the absolute as 
such, were both sexually active and subject to ultimate passivity and even an 
inevitable infection or malignancy. It becomes difficult, if not impossible, for 
Schelling to locate the duplicitous source of life without colliding against the 
ultimate source of illness and demise.15 
Here Krell emphasises sexuality and illness as markers of the organism’s 
highly ambivalent, indeed ‘unnatural’ relationship with Nature.  With sex, both 
an Erotic drive toward the absolute product and a Thanatotic drive back to 
universal indifference explode on to this primal site.  Nature craves its original 
state of indifference, a zero-point that can only be hypothesised behind the 
original diremption: ‘Nature contests the Individual; it longs [verlangt] for the 
Absolute and continually endeavors to represent it. [. . .] Individual products, 
therefore, in which Nature’s activity is at a standstill, can only be seen as 
misbegotten attempts to achieve such a proportion’ (FO 35; my italics).  But just as 
the Stufenfolge is disrupted by the sexual proliferation of beings, each 
‘misbegotten attempt’ also recapitulates Nature’s intrinsic dynamism (FO 25).  
 
15 David Krell, ‘Three Ends of the Absolute: Schelling on Inhibition, Hölderlin on Separation, 
and Novalis on Density’, Research in Phenomenology, vol. 32, 2002, p. 65. 
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As the propensity to reproduce such misbegotten attempts (and consequently 
Nature’s self-inhibition), sexuality is a pestilent force to a Nature yearning for 
primordial indifference. 
There is a compulsion, then, in Nature which is recapitulated in its 
‘misbegotten attempts’ and their persistent strife with Nature.  Perhaps 
nowhere is this made clearer in the First Outline than in Schelling’s admission, 
repressed into the margins of the Introduction to the Outline in a lengthy 
footnote, that  
Nature hates sex, and where it does arise, it arises against the will of Nature. The 
separation into sexes is an inevitable fate, with which, after Nature is once 
organic [. . .] it can never overcome.—By this very hatred of separation it finds 
itself involved in a contradiction, inasmuch as what is odious to Nature it is 
compelled to develop in the most careful manner, and to lead to the summit of 
existence, as if it did so on purpose; whereas it is always striving only for a return 
into the identity of the genus, which, however, is enchained to the (never to be 
canceled) duplicity of the sexes, as to an inevitable condition. [. . .] Nature 
develops the individual only from compulsion. (FO 231 n) 
Thus Nature is hostile to the organism, which is an obstacle to its backward 
yearning for indifference.  But the organism is also necessary for the forward 
unfolding of an absolute product, the consummation of the Stufenfolge which 
already exists as potential in Nature.  Indeed, faced with this pharmakon, 
Nature’s stance toward its own products can only be one of ambivalence and 
anxiety. 
THE ACTANT: DRIVE, DISEASE, DERANGEMENT 
The First Outline’s structure is rhizomatic, a body without organs consisting of 
intersecting and mutually determining systems and disciplines which are 
constellated in a text with numerous ‘undeveloped tendencies’ (Rajan, ‘First 
Outline’, pp. 329-330).  Indeed, one can say that this performativity of the First 
Outline’s Naturphilosophie (un)grounds Schelling’s oeuvre as its metaphysical 
unconscious, the ‘fluidity’ from which the other strands of his philosophy 
emerge and in which they entwine (FO 29).  Never fully plumbing the depths of 
his Nature, but in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy of nature which is 
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‘structured by an anthropomorphism that reads nature as pathologized spirit,’16 
Schelling nevertheless privileges Nature’s productive aporiae in subsequent 
works and phases of his thought.  The First Outline’s Naturphilosophie reveals a 
uniquely idealist intensity in its invocation of a philosophical creation myth, a 
‘Proteus’ drawing all possible forms into a circle ‘determined for it in advance’ 
(FO 28).  Yet this gathering requires ‘infinitely many attempts’ (FO 28), which 
makes the circle both determinate and immanent.  But to articulate the 
dynamic of how this ‘gathering’ comes about, we must turn to what Schelling 
calls the actant as the constituent part of this dynamic productivity. 
In the first of the First Outline’s three Divisions, Schelling develops the actant 
[Aktion]17  as the nonmolar, monadic force articulating Nature’s absolute 
productivity, which is the first principle of the Naturphilosophie’s ‘dynamic 
atomism’ (FO 5).  As unrepresentable combinatory forces in the natural world, 
actants collectively constitute an ‘infinite homogeneity,’ combining in various 
relations and ratios to form different natural products.  Schelling writes: 
[Actants are] the most originary points of inhibition of Nature’s activity. [As] the 
most originary negative presentations of the unconditioned in Nature [they] are 
not themselves in space; they cannot be viewed as parts of matter. [They are, 
rather,] action in general. (FO 19-21) 
Although the actant briefly reappears in his retrospective Introduction to 
the First Outline and the second Division, Schelling does not revisit the concept 
as such elsewhere in his oeuvre.  Nevertheless, the actant plays an important 
role in the First Outline as the fundamental component of ‘the original 
multiplicity of individual principles in Nature. [. . .] Each [actant] in Nature is 
 
16 Tilottama Rajan, ‘Philosophy as Encyclopedia: Hegel, Schelling, and the Organization of 
Knowledge’, Wordsworth Circle, vol. 35, no. 1, 2004, p. 9. 
17 Peterson (FO 244 n. 1) translates Aktion as ‘actant’ instead of ‘action’ (which for him is too 
general) or actor (which for him is too intentional).  But Peterson does not mention the 
‘actant’’s provenance both in narratology and the thought of French philosopher and 
sociologist of science Bruno Latour.  In the narratological framework of Greimasian semiotics, 
actants ‘operate on the level of function rather than content. That is, an actant may embody 
itself in a particular character (termed an acteur) or it may reside in the function of more than 
one character in respect of their common role in the story’s underlying “oppositional” 
structure. In short, the deep structure of the narrative generates and defines its actants at a level 
beyond that of the story’s surface content’ (Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics, 2nd ed., 
London and New York, Routledge, 2003, pp. 70-71). 
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a fixed point for it, a seed around which Nature can begin to form itself’ (FO 21 
n. 1).  And just as Nature ‘forms itself’ around the actant in the phenomenal 
world, so Schelling surrounds the actant with a proliferation of textual 
predicates in an attempt to define it – not unlike the natural catalogue stricken 
from the Oxford Junior Dictionary.  Actants are ‘dynamic atoms,’ ‘pure intensity,’ 
‘originary qualities,’ ‘simple productivities’ of Nature – and yet their ‘simple’ 
nature proves unruly as their Trieb drives them from text into subtext and back 
again in the form of lengthy footnotes complicating and unfolding this 
‘simplicity’ (FO 21 n., 208).  As if sedimenting the actants’ dynamism in the 
texture of language, Schelling’s text itself recapitulates the ‘infinite multiplicity 
of original actants’ (FO 28).  Taking up atomism to define the actant as a factor 
of Nature’s productivity, Schelling concedes that the intangibility of the actants 
is precisely what makes them necessary: 
Our opinion is [. . .] not that there are such simple actants in Nature, but only 
that they are the ideal grounds of the explanation of quality. These simple actants 
do not really allow of demonstration–they do not exist; they are what one must 
posit in Nature, what one must think in Nature, in order to explain the originary 
qualities. (FO 21 n) 
Not existing in space or as matter (but nevertheless ‘constituent factors of 
matter’), and ‘truly singular’ like Leibnizian monads yet infinitely 
decomposable (FO 21 & n.), the actant is a liminality between the ideality of the 
unconditioned and the materiality of space. 
The First Division of the First Outline tries to work through its unruly textual 
excess by turning from the metaphysical overgrowth of the first section on the 
actants (‘The Original Qualities and Actants in Nature’) to something closer to 
dramatic narrative in the following section (‘Actants and Their Combinations’).  
Here, Schelling describes the creation of matter as ‘the drama [Schauspiel] of a 
struggle between form and the formless’ (FO 28).  For Schelling, Nature’s 
universal fluidity is always already inexplicably ‘solidified’ by the actants in this 
drama without beginning, which transpires in ‘infinite multiplicity’ between 
fluid and solid.  That is, the actants, in their creation of natural products, are 
always already subject to a drama of (de)combination in their infinite 
multiplicity.  He writes: 
While the actants are decombined, left to itself each one will produce what it 
must produce according to its nature. To that extent, in every product there will 
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be a constant drive toward free transformation. While the actants are continually 
combined anew, none of them will remain free with respect to its production. 
Thus, there will be compulsion and freedom in the product at once. Since actants 
are constantly set free and recaptured, and since infinitely various combinations 
of them are possible (and in every combination a slew of various proportions are 
possible), then continually new and singular materials will be originally produced 
in this product. It is indeed possible to find the elements of these materials 
through the art of chemistry, but not [. . .] the proportion of the combination. 
(FO 33) 
This dynamic of coalescence and dissolution is ultimately pathologised by 
Schelling as the actants’ mutual derangement [Störung] into universal fluidity, 
which is in turn – indeed, simultaneously resisted by each actant’s individuality 
(FO 26, 28).  This derangement describes what we have seen as Nature’s auto-
alterity, a Nature divided against itself yet compelled to form products in a 
tension which creates generative fibrillations in Nature.  And again, the 
language Schelling uses here is significant: the actant’s ‘constant drive [Trieb] 
toward free transformation’ is inhibited by the ‘compulsion’ [Zwang] of its 
combination with other actants in a productive coimplication of freedom and 
necessity (FO 33).  In the Introduction to the Outline Schelling writes that 
discovering the ‘intermediate links’ in natural products with the unknowable 
‘last conditions’ of Nature is the task of experimentation in Naturphilosophie – not the 
experimentation of the empirical natural sciences which assumes that one day 
the circle of its knowledge will complete itself and which imposes principles on 
Nature from without, but rather an ‘infinite task’ of ‘collect[ing] the fragments 
of the great whole of Nature [. . .] into a system’ (FO 199) which is always on 
the cusp of itself.  It involves investigating the internal necessity of principles 
and not assuming their a priori nature, and this process is ultimately a 
psychoanalytic moment – ‘doing Naturphilosophie’ as an encounter in Wirth’s 
sense – where, in Schelling’s words, ‘Nature speaks to us to the extent to which 
we ourselves fall silent.’18  We must let Nature question us. 
But what kind of ‘questions’ does a deranged Nature ask?  What does its 
facticity present to us?  The natural products we see in the world are, after all, 
 
18 This sentence closes Schelling’s ‘On the Relation Between the Real and Ideal in Nature’ 
(1806), which Iain Hamilton Grant has translated with Schelling’s On the World Soul (1798-1809).  
I am grateful to him for generously providing me with a copy of the unpublished draft. 
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‘nothing other than productive Nature itself determined in a certain way’ (FO 
34), inhibited according to inscrutable laws into the unique, terrible, and 
solitary forms which surround us.  Each one of them is part of Schelling’s 
Stufenfolge, the graduated series of stages with which Nature hopes to achieve the 
Absolute, or ‘the most universal proportion in which all actants, without 
prejudice to their individuality, can be unified’ (FO 35).  Yet each natural 
product is also a ‘misbegotten attempt’ at this proportion (ibid.), a wayward line 
of flight away from the absolute ideal for which Nature strives, but can never 
achieve, caught in an ‘infinite process of formation’ (ibid.) which constitutes 
these lines of flight to begin with.  Nature is caught within its actantial 
dynamics – within the derangement of a free drive to create infinite products 
and the compulsion to combine them into a ‘universal proportion.’  It is from 
this derangement that the materiality and historicity of Being emerges.   
This infinitely productive derangement of the actants forms an onto-
aetiology which Schelling locates in disease.  Disease, for Schelling, is 
coterminous with life itself: because disease ‘is produced by the same causes 
through which the phenomenon of life is produced[, it] must have the same 
factors as life’ (FO 160).  So although in the First Outline’s Appendix on disease 
(FO 158ff) the term Aktion is not used, Schelling in effect transposes the actants’ 
deranging dynamism of activity and receptivity into physiology: here, the 
organism is not a static ‘being’ but a ‘perpetual being-produced,’ an ‘activity 
mediated by receptivity’ (FO 160) against a series of external stimuli which 
prevent the organism from ‘exhausting’ its activity in a final (dead, inorganic) 
object.   In this ‘being-produced,’ the organism reproduces an ‘original 
duplicity’ whereby it generates itself ‘objectively’ in response to external 
conditions (its receptivity to the world) as well as ‘subjectively’ – that is, as an 
object to itself (its activity).   Disease is precisely the ‘othering’ of the organism’s 
presence to itself as object, a ‘disproportion’ within its economy of excitability, 
or susceptibility to external stimuli (FO 169).  And this force of disease is 
ultimately predicated on a ‘uniformly acting external force’ which acts on the 
organism while at the same time it ‘seems to sustain the life of universal Nature 
just as much as it sustains the individual life of every organic being (as the life of 
Nature is exhibited in universal alterations)’ (FO 171).  Both life and disease, 
then, emerge from a constitutive tension between the world of external forces 
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and the higher-order dynamical force which sustains the organism against the 
barrage of stimuli from without (FO 161).  Extending the premises of the 
Naturphilosophie into the human and divine domains of theodicy, the Freedom 
essay, to which we now turn, aligns this diseased productivity with both the 
energy of evil and the yearning nature of God itself. 
THE FREEDOM ESSAY: THE UNGRUND AND THE ENERGY OF EVIL 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of  Human Freedom (1809) is Schelling’s 
attempt at a theodicy which surpasses the Leibnizian notion of evil as lack of 
Being and Hegel’s somewhat more complicated understanding of evil as 
negation ultimately gathered up into the grand teleological Aufhebung of 
absolute Spirit.  Watermarked by the trauma and anxiety of the First Outline’s 
Nature, the Freedom essay recasts this anxiety in the contexts of God, man, and 
their complex relations as Schelling’s self-described ‘theory of personality’.19  
The question of how Nature creates its products is translated into the question 
of how God and its human analogue, personality, enter time and history.  More 
specifically, the issue here, as it was for Nature in the First Outline, is that of 
individuation – of how individual entities come into being, exist and persist in the 
world. 
The Freedom essay returns to the Stufenfolge of the First Outline, but casts it as 
the series of stages through which God himself must proceed.  In other words, 
where the First Outline’s speculative physics theorised the emergence of entities 
in Nature as part of Nature’s individuation toward the absolute product, the 
Freedom essay turns to God, who for Schelling is ‘not a system, but rather a life’ 
that must also individuate (Freedom 62).  Alan White explains that in contrast to 
the idealist intensity of Schelling’s earlier work such as the System of  
Transcendental Idealism (1800), in the Freedom essay ‘the ground as such is said to 
have all content within it and to resist being grasped or explained by the power 
of understanding, to resist revealing itself in actual existence [. . .] the source of 
 
19 Friedrich Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love 
and Johannes Schmidt, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2006, p. 73.  Hereafter 
cited parenthetically in the text as Freedom. 
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content is obscurity and darkness rather than clarity and light.’20  This darkness 
which recedes from knowledge in the Freedom essay is ‘a being before all ground 
and before all that exists [and] before any duality [. . .] the original ground or 
the non-ground [Ungrund]’ which exists even before God (Freedom 68).  The 
Ungrund is a state of  ‘absolute indifference’ (Freedom 68) between opposites which 
does not nullify them (it is not Hegel’s ‘night where all cows are black’) but 
rather suspends them in relation to each other.  Thus, Schelling writes that 
even though the Ungrund is before all opposites and duality, it is ‘neutral’ 
towards them, which is precisely why opposites and polarities can ‘[break] forth 
immediately from the Neither-Nor’ of its indifference (Freedom 69). 
For Schelling, the Ungrund provides a resolution to the problem of thinking 
becoming for a God that is ‘infinitely’ different to the world of things (28), a 
resolution which marks the materiality of Nature as the dark ground of spirit, 
the receding origin of Being and becoming.  The world of becoming must 
emerge from God; but how can things separate from a God which encompasses 
all things?  Schelling’s answer is that things are ultimately grounded in ‘that 
which in God himself is not He Himself, that is, in that which is the ground of his 
existence’ (Freedom 28).  In other words, the Ungrund marks the not-God within 
God, that within God which God cannot know and which always already 
implicates God in the history of Nature.  In a broadly psychoanalytic sense, the 
Ungrund is God’s unconscious; it harbours ‘the yearning the eternal One feels to 
give birth to itself’ (Freedom 28), the drive to individuation in and through 
Nature’s materiality.  But we have seen from the Naturphilosophie that this 
materiality is deranged, ambivalent toward its own existence; perhaps this is 
why Schelling writes early in the Freedom essay that Naturphilosophie is the only 
project adequate to the task of freedom (Freedom 26-27).  As life, then, God’s 
yearning is driven by unknown forces, and in this God is like man.  Both God 
and man are confronted with an un-grounding Other which becomes an 
existential pharmakon, both the cause of and cure for the melancholic desire of 
an endless approximation to wholeness.  Both God and man are destined to 
‘the deep indestructible melancholy of all life’ (Freedom 63).  Melancholy 
 
20 Alan White, Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom, New Haven and London, Yale 
University Press, 1983, pp. 119-120. 
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[Melancholie] is only mentioned once in the Freedom essay, but it is pervasive 
within the text’s individuative economy.  This tension between the essay’s sense 
of futurity (its desire for love that unites all) and melancholy (the 
acknowledgement that this desire must find and re-find itself) is central to the 
text’s complexity, resonating through the optative proclamation that ‘the good 
should be raised out of the darkness [. . .] whereas evil should be separated from 
the good in order to be cast out eternally into non-Being’ (Freedom 67; my 
italics).  This tension and melancholy is the medium from which personality 
emerges as the core concept which fuels the Freedom essay’s futurity. 
This melancholy is the basis for the analogy Schelling draws between God’s 
relationship to the not-God of the Ungrund and the human being’s relationship 
with the centrum, a term Schelling takes up from Jakob Böhme to describe ‘the 
undivided power of the initial ground’ as it exists in the person (Freedom 44).  
Through the freedom of the not-God within God, ‘a fundamentally unlimited 
power is asserted next to and outside of divine power’ (Freedom 11) that is 
conceptually unthinkable, and which inaugurates a divine individuation 
marking Schelling’s radical turn from the notions of emanationism and 
theodicy prevailing in his time.  This not-God within God marks the 
(un)beginning of all things as a difference always already operating in Being, 
and this (un)beginning’s human equivalent is in Schelling’s formulation of 
personality.  
In contrast to Hegel’s assertion that dialectical progression is always already 
attributed to Being – that ‘substance is essentially subject’ and inherently 
logical21 – the Freedom essay emphasises the emergence of personality in an 
unprethinkable ‘moment’ of creation analogous to God’s entry into time and 
history, a non-egoic ‘free act’ from the abyss of the unconditioned: 
Man is in the initial creation [. . .] an undecided being— [. . .] only man himself 
can decide. But this decision cannot occur within time; it occurs outside of all 
time and, hence, together with the first creation (though as a deed distinct from 
creation). (Freedom 51) 
Like Nature’s original diremption in the First Outline, ‘decision’ [Entscheidung] 
cannot be an act of conscious volition, since it precedes ego.  Rather, it is a 
 
21 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. Michael Inwood, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2019, p. 13. 
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primordial scission which inaugurates becoming.  This paradoxically free and 
necessary act means that freedom is the freedom to exist as one must, and this free 
necessity is the kernel of Schelling’s philosophy of freedom.  For Schelling this 
paradox, as personality, is ‘the connection between a self-determining being 
and a basis [centrum] independent of him’ (Freedom 59).  And crucially for the 
Freedom essay’s protopsychological dimension, this act leaves in each individual 
a residual  feeling of personality in time and history, as the mark of both what 
one has always been and what one must also be.  This feeling is ‘a feeling in 
accord with [this act] as if he had been what he is already from all eternity and 
had by no means become so first in time. [Thus this act] cannot appear in 
consciousness to the degree the latter is self-awareness and only ideal, since it 
precedes consciousness just as it precedes essence, indeed, first produces it’ 
(Freedom 51). 
Key to the specifically idealist intensity of the Freedom essay’s theodicy is a 
recasting of the First Outline’s Stufenfolge as God’s progression toward an ultimate 
apocatastasis, a ‘final, total separation’ reminiscent of The Book of  Revelation 
wherein ‘everything true and good’ is ‘raised into bright consciousness’ and the 
‘eternally dark ground of selfhood’ is locked away (Freedom 70).  In this 
resolution, everything is ‘subordinate to spirit’ and temporality and contingency 
are gathered up into an idealist regime (ibid.).  Yet its disclosure of the Ungrund 
as God’s unconscious, and the centrum as its human iteration, necessarily 
harbours a dark kernel of indeterminacy which frustrates this teleology.  
Individuation can go awry, and the power of the centrum can always be falsely 
appropriated in the ego’s being-for-itself, which Schelling will describe as the 
basis of evil.  Freedom is the necessary introduction of chaos and the anarchy of 
the Ungrund into time and history, a fracturing of the Freedom essay’s Idealism 
which reflects Schelling’s turn away from prevalent teleological or systematic 
explanations of Being.  Evil is the energic force of movement without which 
existence would founder and congeal, unable to move.   
In the Freedom essay, Schelling closely aligns evil with disease; what disease is 
to Nature, evil is to human spiritual life.  Evil results from the self’s 
estrangement, as the ‘dark principle of [. . .] self-will,’ from the centrum.  In this 
estrangement, the will ‘steps out from its being beyond nature’ to ‘elevate the 
ground over the cause, to use the spirit that it obtained only for the sake of the 
centrum outside the centrum and against creatures; from this results collapse 
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within the will itself and outside it’ (Freedom 34).  In other words, self-will 
attempts to bend the centrum to its own designs.  Outside the harmony of the 
centrum’s ‘divine measure and balance’ self-will, as ‘a bond of living forces,’ can 
no longer rule the rebellious dominion of forces as ‘cravings and appetites,’ 
which leads to a ‘peculiar life [of] mendacity, a growth of restlessness and 
decay’ (Freedom 34).  Evil is a disruption of cosmic harmony which thereby 
shows this harmony’s constitutive self-difference; it is the force whereby ‘things 
feverishly move away from their nonthingly center.’22  But this evil is productive, 
and in precisely the same way as Nature’s ambivalence toward its products in 
the First Outline.  This productivity’s connection with historicity and materiality 
risks the individual’s annihilation in ‘restlessness and decay’ as the ego 
proclaims: I am the centrum.  But it is also a connection with the the Freedom 
essay’s apocatastatic drive, and is thus essential to the individual’s existence in 
the world.   
Thus, Schelling’s account of freedom both diagnoses creaturely existence as 
what the First Outline called a ‘misbegotten attempt’ – here, a 
miscomprehension of the proper relation to ‘universal will’ – and prognoses 
‘transfiguration’ by which the person (as creature) unites with ‘the primal will’ 
of understanding so that ‘a single whole comes into being’ (Freedom 32).  In this 
prognosis, individuation is the blind will’s elevation into something more than 
itself as part of the universal will or ‘principle of understanding.’  Personality is 
‘selfhood raised to spirit’ (Freedom 38), both a cision in the individual and a 
connection with the ideal as ‘will that beholds itself in complete freedom [as] 
above and outside of all nature’ (Freedom 33).  In Schelling’s drama of freedom, 
individuation is not driven by a process of identification or the unfolding of 
something preformed.  Rather, the ‘mutation and division of all forces’ drives 
self-will from its darkness into a transfiguration where it paradoxically becomes 
particular and universal as ‘selfhood.’  Yet this prognosis is nevertheless of a 
completed individuation.  However, if will is groundless Being, what does it mean 
to unify with the centrum, the primal will?  Is it not to expose oneself to Nature’s 
derangement?  In the Freedom essay, this imperilment is the evil nature of the 
 
22 Jason Wirth, The Conspiracy of Life: Meditations on Schelling and His Time, Albany, State 
University of New York Press, 2003, p. 170. 
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world – the inevitable suspension of this transfiguration as the condition for 
time and history.  This positive force of evil persists in spite of Schelling’s efforts 
to fold individuation’s productivity back into an Idealist economy through the 
Freedom essay’s scriptural traces of ‘darkness’ and ‘light.’  Likewise, the Freedom 
essay’s bright horizon of spirit is clouded by the dark indeterminacy of the 
relationship between existence and the Ungrund: the ‘anarchy’ of the ground 
can always break through to existence (Freedom 29), and this is man’s 
‘propensity’ [Hang] for evil as the energy of personality in time and history 
(Freedom 47).  Personality always runs the risk, as personality, of being derailed, 
deranged, or mutated by one force or another being for-itself, irrespective of 
the integrity of the whole.  And with this productive derangement and 
indeterminacy at the heart of Nature and its human actors, we turn now to the 
implications of such un-grounding potency for ecological civilisation’s 
transformative project. 
CONCLUSION: FORSAKING, OR GIVING INDETERMINACY ITS DUE 
Ecological civilisation and its desire for a transformative ethics is informed by 
what Gare identifies as a specifically Schellingian speculative naturalism, one 
which, based on Schelling’s Naturphilosophie of opposing forces, gravity and 
magnetism, ultimately aims at the constructive transformation of culture and 
the ‘overcoming’ of contemporary neoliberalist nihilism in the ecological, 
social, and economic spheres.23  Schelling is thus understood as the progenitor 
of ‘a system that overcame the oppositions between idealism and realism, 
spiritualism and materialism.’24  But can we speak with confidence in terms of 
‘overcoming’ and positive political action in a framework where drive and 
compulsion, in possessing psyche and Nature, dispossess them from each other 
and themselves?  When human beings can never be guaranteed as ‘rational 
actors’? 
Bruce Matthews has more directly advocated for an ‘activist’ reading of 
Schelling’s Nature, suggesting that Schelling’s mythology of nature harbours a 
 
23 See Gare, ‘Speculative Naturalism’, pp. 314-315, 300-301. 
24 Arran Gare, ‘From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological 
Civilization’, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 2, 2011, p. 
28. 
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‘utopian potential’ with ‘an emancipatory power capable of liberating an 
engaged hope from its bondage to the ideology of irony that currently 
emasculates transformative political action.’25  To be sure, Matthews points to 
the ‘organic, and thus partially chaotic, process of self-differentiation that 
generates increasingly complex iterative systems’.26  But he nevertheless gathers 
up this differentiation into an Idealist project of ‘balanced relationship [and] 
reciprocity with nature’s nexus of living forces’ in the name of ‘redemptive 
harmony’.27  Matthews ultimately resuscitates an anthropocentric fantasy of 
‘realizing a unity with nature’28 which, in an ideological sleight-of-hand, 
reinstates human freedom in its idealist intensity as a future which ‘offers 
unseen possibilities and thus an open-ended orientation to what should be’.29  
Transforming Schelling’s ‘should’ from an optative to an ethical imperative, 
Matthews acknowledges the aleatory energy of this self-differentiation but 
asserts transformative political action as an unproblematic possibility within this 
stochastic matrix, insisting on a ‘subversive and emancipatory power’ (ibid., p. 
216) in Schelling’s ‘mythology of nature’ which cannot be corroborated by this 
Nature.  Casting Schelling’s Nature as a platform for a neo-Kantian kingdom 
of ends, Matthews ultimately eclipses Nature’s radical productivity by 
assuming, as part of his desire for transformative politics, that humanity can 
and will one day overcome the very Nature articulated by Schelling’s 
Naturphilosophie. 
By invoking Schelling’s later idea of a philosophical religion, the concept of 
an ecological civilisation aims to uncover what Gare calls ‘a Weltanschauung 
inclusive enough to overcome philosophy’s compulsive tendency to splinter off 
into mutually exclusive schools of thought’ (Gare, ‘From Kant to Schelling to 
Process Philosophy’, p. 68).  To this end he draws on C.D. Broad, who writes 
that speculative naturalism seeks ‘to take over all aspects of human experience, 
 
25 Bruce Matthews, ‘The New Mythology: Romanticism Between Religion and Humanism’, in 
Dalia Nassar (ed.), The Relevance of Romanticism: Essays on German Romantic Philosophy, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 203. 
26 Matthews, ‘The New Mythology’, pp. 207-8. 
27 Matthews, ‘The New Mythology’, p. 212. 
28 Matthews, ‘The New Mythology’, p. 213. 
29 Matthews, ‘The New Mythology’, p. 215. 
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to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a view of Reality as a whole which 
shall do justice to all of them’ (qtd. in Gare, ‘Speculative Naturalism’, p. 302).  
But ‘doing justice to them’ paradoxically involves exploring the ways in which 
one paradigm, one force, one entity, one psyche in a system troubles and risks 
unworking, even deranging another; it involves being attuned to the paradox of 
the actants, both individual and inextricably bound to and prehended by the 
others.  And given the productive nature of Schelling’s evil, the drive to be for-
itself which marks Broad’s philosophical splintering, is this movement not part 
of the dynamism which drives existence itself in its peril and risk?  Should it be 
‘overcome’ when it so crucially informs Broad’s conception of ‘the whole range 
of human experience’ (ibid.)?  And yet is it feasible to resist the human, all-too-
human urge to overcome such divisions?  I suggest that Schelling ultimately – 
perhaps against his will – issues an inconclusive challenge to the necessary 
anthropomorphism of speculative naturalism in conceding that ‘emergent 
levels’ of organisation (Gare, ‘Speculative Naturalism’, p. 321) may have 
nothing to do with the privileging, and little to do with the survival of a 
humanity which will always follow to some extent the derangement of 
Schelling’s Nature.  At the point where Schelling’s thought touches Speculative 
Realism’s disavowal of the correlation between thought and Being, his 
Naturphilosophie explicitly reserves the right to see humanity collectively as a 
‘misbegotten attempt.’  And this right (to use human terms) includes the right to 
deploy discursive vehicles including (but not limited to) neoliberalism itself as 
the means to discard such aberrations and continue its scrabbling both back 
and onward to the stasis of the Absolute.  Neoliberalist capitalism as telluric 
autoimmunological response; a less than cheery prospect for the species to be 
sure. 
What, then, is to be done?  Does this mean we have no other choice than 
the nihilism Nietzsche tried unsuccessfully to dispel, or the cognitive dissonance 
of political leaders when faced with the destructive and seemingly 
uncontrollable autonomy of military, industrial and capital economies?  If we 
are to listen to Nature’s interrogations and deranged whisperings, to what 
extent are we collectively willing to hear objections to our way of life and the 
rationalist fantasy, promoted perhaps first and foremost by the United Nations, 
that a species of more than seven billion is somehow one ‘human family,’ each 
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of whose members deserve everything the world has to offer?  No organism in 
the history of the planet has numbered in the billions and survived in perpetuity 
by according each of its members such privilege, and yet our collective ethics 
seems to demand no less.  But does the answer lie in an ethics?  John Caputo 
distinguishes between the ‘thou shalt’s of the ethical and the freedom of what 
he calls a poetics of  obligation, a species of morality which ‘happens’ in an event 
unbound by the discursive confines of ethics.30  Nomadic and not architectonic, 
this happening is morality as obligation, which contains an undecidability that 
destabilises ethics as its (Derridean) dangerous supplement even as it insists on 
decision, albeit decision freed from the guarantees of the ethical.  This poetics of 
obligation is the outcome of a deconstruction of ethics which preserves a 
connectedness with others, both human and nonhuman.  For Caputo, it is 
the feeling that comes over us when others need our help, when they call out for 
help, or support, or freedom, or whatever they need, a feeling that grows in 
strength directly in proportion to the desperateness of the situation of the other. 
The power of  obligation varies directly with the powerlessness of  the one who calls for help, 
which is the power of  powerlessness.31 
This obligation is a chemical binding, a magnetic pull between the person 
and ‘the Other’ in its most general sense as ‘a deep anonymity in things, in the 
world, in the stars as in ourselves,’ the uncanny force within ethics that ethics 
cannot contain.32  To use a Schellingian turn of phrase I have developed here, 
it is the non-ethical within ethics.  The chemical-magnetic bind of obligation, then, 
is bound to bring some together in moments of morality while leaving others on 
the outside.  As a dissolution of the guarantees of the ethical the poetics of 
obligation, and its due diligence paid to the uniqueness of personality which 
moves, corpuscular, through and across all discourse, always risks what others 
will inevitably call obscenity – in Caputo’s words, the risk that Yahweh’s 
command that Abraham sacrifice Isaac stands on the same footing as the 
commands Nazi officers gave to their soldiers to kill Jews.33  And yet this risk of 
 
30 John Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to 
Deconstruction, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1993, pp. 4-5. 
31 Caputo, Against Ethics, p. 5. 
32 Caputo, Against Ethics, p. 18. 
33 Caputo, Against Ethics, p. 10. 
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obscenity is the very condition of freedom. 
Is there an ethics of the future which can do justice to the magnetism of 
obligation?  One which can incorporate its indeterminate remainder?  One 
capable of sustaining a humanist equilibrium between the desire for system and 
the drive to derange the whole in the name of free transformation?  Or must 
we ultimately forsake ethics and the architectonic of a decrepit, seven-billion 
‘strong’ body politic in favour of the nomadic, the corpuscular, and the 
‘organic’ – that is, organs separating from the metaphoric body as actants both 
for-themselves and bound to others according to the inscrutable intensities of 
magnetism?  If there is a ‘solution’ to this dilemma, perhaps it lies in cultivating 
a willingness to forsake – the strength to deprive ourselves of comfort and 
consumption not only as a pragmatic duty in a world with finite resources, but 
also as a philosophical sensitivity to our membership in a Nature which 
surpasses us.  Kierkegaard, speaking as Johannes Climacus, states the matter 
succinctly:  
When a man has filled his mouth so full of food that for this reason he cannot eat 
and it must end with his dying of hunger, does giving food to him consist in 
stuffing his mouth even more or, instead, in taking a little away so that he can 
eat? Similarly, when a man is very knowledgeable but his knowledge is 
meaningless or virtually meaningless to him, does sensible communication consist 
in giving him more to know, even if he loudly proclaims that this is what he 
needs, or does it consist, instead, in taking something away from him?34 
In the same spirit, there is a Chinese folk tale which tells a story of the 
herding of cattle at the end of the season.  While the cattle were led into their 
enclosure, one door was always left open; those cattle who wandered through 
the open door into the wilderness were allowed to go unhindered as homage to 
the powers of indeterminate Being.  If there is something encrypted in this 
parable for the future of an ecological civilisation, perhaps we must give serious 
thought to what we, collectively, must let go to give Nature its due. 
 
gordbarentsen@outlook.com 
 
34 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong, 2 vols., vol. 1, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 275. 
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